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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LUCILLE BUCKLEY HALL,
Defendant-Appellant,
vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH, NA, Administrator of the
estates of George Hatton Buckley
and Pearl :Murdock Buckley,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

Case No.
12837

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The administrator of an estate brought suit for
conversion and unlawful sale of certain stock certificates by a daughter of the deceased who was one of
three heirs of the estate, the daughter claiming ownership of the stock certificates by virtue of two separate
intervivos gifts.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Court below granted judgment in favor of the
Administrator for the net amount of the proceeds of
the sale of the s to c k certificates in the sum of

2
$25,501.52, plus 500 shares of stuck in a successor cor·

poration to the original stock company. The Court below, as part of the pretrial, considered motions for summary judgment made hy both parties and pmsuant
thereto determined that the sole issues to be resolved in
the trial of the case, was whether or not a valid gift in·
tervivos had been made of the Father's stock certifi·
cates, first, from the Father to the .Mother and then
from the l\lother to Lhe Daughter who is appellant
herein. It is basically from the pretrial order, which puts
the burden of proof of the gift on the Appellant and
the requirements that that proof be made by "clear and
com'incing evidence" that this appeal is made. Appel·
lant macle no objection to the pretrial order prior to
this appeal.
STA'l'El\IENT OF FACTS
In approximately 1937 George Hatton Buckley
acquired 5500 shares of capitol stock of l\Iercur Dome
Goldmining Company, the five share certificates
issuecl in his sole name and were kept by him through·
ont his life in a small black box containing, along with
the share certificates, other important papers belonging
to himself and his wife Pearl Murdock Buckley.
l\I r. Iluckley, after many years of ill health died
in Hl50, he was at death seized of no real property and
after his demise, a few items of personal property were
rlistributed among his three children by his wife. The
stock certificates were never endorsed and remained in
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the same box which after Mr. Buckley's death was in the
sole possession of the widow until shortly before her demise in 196:3. She likewise owned no real property but
after her death, her daughter, the Appellant herein and
two older brothers Bert and Gerald, informally divided
the l\Iother's personal property. In neither of these informal proceedings was any mention made of the stock
certificates which still stood in their Father's name, the
stock being considered valueless at the time. In 1969, the
stock apparently took on some inflated value for a short
period of time, which information was communicated
to the Appellant by her brother Gerald. She took the
stock to a stock broker, sold 5,000 shares for a net return of $25,501.52, and converted the remaining 500
shares to 500 shares of stock in the successor corporation, S.A.S.I.
'\Then the appellant declined to divide the money
and the stock with her two brothers, the brothers filed
for probate of the estate of their parents and the respondent herein was appointed as Administrator of that
estate. Respondent filed this civil action on behalf of
the estate for conversion of the property of the estate
by the appellant herein.
ARGUMENT

POINT I: IN A CONTEST BETWEEN
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
E S T AT E AND AN HEIR WHO
CLAIMS PROPEUTY OF THE DE-
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CEASED BY VJHTUE OF AN INTERVIVOS GIFT ADVERSELY TO THE
ADMINISTRATOR, WHICH PARTY
HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF?
A succinct and universally accepted statement as
to ultimate burden of proof as between the Plaintiff
and Defendant in a civil suit is set forth in 29 Al\IJUR
2 ( d) EVIDENCE, Section 128 at page 161 as fol·
lows:
"The party upon whom the ultimate burden of
proof lies is determined hy the pleadings, not
by who is plaintiff or defendant. 'Vhether this
bunlen rests with the Plaintiff or the defendant may be determined by ascertaining
which party, without evidence, would be compelled to submit to an adverse judgment on the
pleadings. This fact is determined from the
pleadings before the introduction of any evidence.
Ordinarily the burden of proof is in the first
instance with the party who initiates the act;on
or proceeding that is, the Plaintiff. In other
words, a plaintiff, by ascertaining in his complaint, petition or declaration, facts which
proved, established a liability due him on the
part of the defendant, has the burden of proving these facts. But there is no strict and
rigid rule that the primary burden of proof
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1e party who brings the suit; ... "

case hefore the Court, it is alleged by the
hat the stock was the property of George
ckley and that it contained to be his proptil the time of his death. Numerous pleading sworn affidavits by the appellant hereiat the stock did in fact belong to her father,
erts as an affirmative defense to the claim
her by the complaint, that she was the rean interYivos gift of the stock from her
o in turn appellant claimed to have been a
· an intervivos gift from the Father. This
an affirmative defense in respect to which
es:

mrden of proof is upon the defendant
lll affirmative defenses which he sets
mswer to the Plaintiff's claim or cause
on upon which issue is joined, whether
:late to the whole case or only to certain
n the case. As sometimes expressed, the
is on the defendant to provide new matas a defense. This rule does not
a shifting of the burden of proof, but
means that each party must establish
1 case. 'Vhen the Defendant comes in
mits facts stated by the Plaintiff to be
id sets up matters in avoidance, he is
:ty who asserts the truth of the matter
:t up and the burden is upon him to
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establish the facts on whieh that matter is
preclicated. If he fails to do so, the Plaintiff
is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor."
(29 Al\fJUR 2 (d) EVIDENCE Section
129, at page 162, 163. Also, see Rees vs. Archibald, 6 Utah 2 ( d) 264, 311 P. 2 ( d) 788, headnote 9.)
The Rules of Pleading in the State of Utah which
are applicable are as follows:
"URCP 8(c) AFFIRl\lATIVE DEFENSES. In pleading to a preceeding
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively
... any other matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense ... "
"URCP 9 (c) CONDITIONS
DENT. In pleading the performance or occurrance of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to a\·er generally that all conditions
precedent have been performed or have occured. A denial of performance or occurance
shall be made with particularity and when so
made the party pleading the performance or
occurance shall on the trial establish the facts
showing such performance or occurance."
(Emphasis added)
The administrator of an estate has a statutory duty
and authority to claim possession of any property be·
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longing to the decedent (See 75-11-3 and 75-11-5,
UCA, 1953 as amended.)
In exerting such possessory rights he stands in the
same position as the decedent would have assumed had
he still been alive. It appears time and again in the
pleadings of both pa1+es that the stock was in the name
of George Hatton Buckley and was his property during his lifetime, and it would be pointless to require the
putting on of any evidence to prove a fact so patently
admitted by the appellant. A pretrial was had on the
matter by the terms of which pretrial order, dated the
28th day of September, 1971, and denominated "Decision'', the Court determined that:
There was no competent evidence before the
Court to enable it to make a finding as to whether there
had been a valid intervivos gift from George Hatton
Buckley to his wife Pearl l\Iurdock Buckley.
1.

2. That there was no competent evidence before
the Court to enable it to make a findings in respect to
whether there had been a valid intervivos gift from
Pearl Murdock Buckley to Lucille Buckley Hall.

That the Defendant (appellant) would have
the burden of going forward with the evidence.
3.

This decision was entirely consistent with the
posture of the case at the pretrial, and inasmuch as both
issues were raised by the affirmative defense asserted

by the Appellant, it was right and proper that she be
required to bear the burden of proving the factual issues.

The Court in its final decision and judgment on '
the matter determined that the appellant had failed to
bear the burden of proving the facts which she alleged
and judgment was therefore rightly granted against
her.

POINT II:

DID THE TRIAL COURT
ERR IN Il\IPOSING UPON THE APPELLANT THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN INTERVIVOS GIFT IN TWO
INSTANCES BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE?
The weight and sufficiency of evidence necessary
to prove a rnlid interviYos gift such as would be suffi.
cient to cut off the claims of an administrator to stock
still held in the name of the deceased at the time of his
death has genera1ly been held to be more than the mere
preponderance of the evidence.
Am J ur discusss the matter in two separate sec·
tions as follows:

ao

A:\l.TUR 2 ( d) EVIDENCE, Section 1167, at
344 and 3-J.5:
"Proof of those issues as to which a stricter
degree of proof than by a proponderance of
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the evidence is required by the Courts is generally satisfie<l by 'clear and convincing' evidence, or evi<lence that is 'clear and satisfactory', or evidence described by similar terms
for example ... this degree of proof has been
required in order to prove a gift ... "
The commentary also quotes the Utah case of
Burningham vs. Bnrke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P. 977, 46
ALR 466.
Also, 38 Al\I JUR 2(d) GIFTS, Section 103:
"It has generally been held, in most jurisdictions, that in order to sustain a gift intervivos
or a gift causa mortis the evidence must be
clear an<l convincing. It has accordingly been
stated that a mere preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient to establish the fact of
a gift.
Especially does this 'clear and convincing' degree of proof apply where the gift, either interYivos or causa mortis is not asserted until
after the death of the alleged donor, in which
respect it is settled that, in view of the possibility of frau<l or pretense in such a case, the
claim of gift must be sustained by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence of every element which is requisite to constitute a gift."
(As to the requisite elements of a valid gift,
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see 38 Al\1 .JUR 2 ( d) Gifts, Section 16, at
Page 818.)

The Supreme Court of our State has ruled man
times as to the degree of proof required to prove a gif
for instances .!ones et al vs. Cook, 118 Utah 5G2, 22
P. 2 ( d), 423 where it states, commencing at Page 421
"There is no presumption in favor of a gift
inter vivos. One who asserts title by gift inter
vivos has the burden of proving that a gift was
made, including the existence of all of the elements essential to its validity." 24 Al\IJUR
GIFTS Page 790; Spencer vs. Barlow, 319
l\Io. 835, 5 S'\T 2 (cl) 28. The Rule is that:
"a clear and unmistakable intention on the part
of the donor to make a gift of his property is
an essential requisite of the gift inter vivos."
38 C.J.S. Gifts, Section 15, page 790: This
Court held in Christensen vs. Ogden State
Bank, 75 Utah 478, 286 P. 638 and H ol111an
vs. Dcscrct Savings Bank, 41 Utah 340, 124
P. 7G5, that proof that the decedent intended
title to pass to the claimant during the lifetime
of the decedent must be clear and convincing.
In Raleigh vs. TV ells, 29 Utah 217, 81 P. 908,
910, this court also declared: "courts watch
gifts inter vivos with caution, especially as
when their enforcement would result in inequitable distribution of the decedent's property."
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The appellants' brief cites the case of In Re Hill's
Estate, 8 Ill. Opp. 2 (cl) 243, 17 4 NE 2 (d) 233, where

at Page 235, the Supreme Court of Illinois set the stand
of proof as "clear and convincing". The case itself is
otherwise easily discernable from the one before the
Court at this time, inasmuch as it had reference to a
citation proceedings under the Illinois Probate Act
which provides that the party claiming adverse to the
estate be required to testify (contrary to the Dead
l\Ian's Statute 78-24-2, UCA, 1953 as amended, which
we have in the State of Utah.) Counsel also quotes
extensiYely in his statement, "facts" from the testimony
of the appellant given at the trial as to conversations
between appellant and her deceased Father, all of those
conversations were correctly ruled by the trial court as
stricken from the records, that particular evidence being
contrary to Utah's Dead Man's Statute, 78-24-2 UCA
1953.

The trial court was clearly in error in relying on
the case of II arri11gton vs. I ntcr.'!tate Fidelity Building
and Loan Association, 91 U tab 74, 63 P. 2 ( d) 577 as
authority that it was not necessary for a completed gift
that the certificate be endorsed by the owner at the time
of its delivery. It is respectfully submitted that the
Court erred in the law in that the Harrington case dealt
not with stock certificates, but merely with a subscription certificate in a savings and loan institution, which
was for all intents and purposes merely a savings account subscription agreement. The Harrington case is
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discussecl in full in 143 .A LR 1154 and that annotation
points out correctly, that stock certificates, as differen·
tiated from savings and loan subscription certificates,
are subject to the Uniform Stock Transfer Act which
was in effect in the State of Utah at the time of both
purported gifts. Under the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, 16-3-1, UCA, 1953, execution of the stock cer·
tificate or by separate written documentation, was a
prerequisite to a valid transfer of stock, the Uniform
Stock Act was repealed by Sections 70a-10-102, but
not until years after the purported transfers claimed by
the appellant.
Notwithstanding the error made by the trial court
m misconstruing the Ilarrington case, the Court still
held that as a matter of fact the appellant had failed
to adduce creditable evidence to show the purported
transfers by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court having correctly placed the burden of
proof and correctly set the burden of proof "clear aud
com·incing evidence" it is unnecessary to reply to Point
I I of the appellant's argument. since it deals only with
appellants' disagreement with the trial court as to what
the facts were and that is not a matter which can be
reviewed in this case, but should be left to the deter·
rninat;on of the finder of fact on the trial court level.
Counsel for appellant relies on Arizona Title
Guarantee and Tru.'lt Company vs. 1'Vagner, 251 P.
2 ( d) 897, in respect to a gift between Mr. and :Mrs.
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Buckley. The facts in the Buckley case indicate without equivocation, however, that the stock certificates
owned by 1\1 r. Buckley were kept in the same place after
the purported gift, that they were before; that it was
equally within the control of both spouses and that :Mr.
l3uckley actually c,rercised dominion and control over
the stock and on at least one occasion got it out and
showed it to his son Gerald, (see trial transcript page
189.) these facts are not in anyway similar to the Arizona case. For the law on delivery of gifts please see
Foster ·vs. Reiss 48 ALR 2 ( d) 1391.
Appellants contention that there was a distribution
de facto of the estates of either of the parties is in conflict with the facts claimed even by the Appellant.
There was in fact no defacto distribution with respect to the stock certificates and no written agreement
sueh as could he recognized as a de facto distribution
in respect to either estate. (See trial transcript pages
209, 210.)

How counsel can assume that such a distribution
without administration and with the appellant collecting
the whole estate valued at approximately $30,000, could
be "fair" is a little hard to understand.
In the third point of argument the appellant intimates that since appellant obtained a bond that the
Plaintiff herein ought not pursue her for the money
which she has converted, but instead go after the bond-
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ing company. This theory is patently without any legal
basis, in the event that it is not possible to recover from
the appellant that which the Court has decreed in judg·
ment against her it may he necessary for the estate to ·
proceed against the bonding company and transfer
agent, but that it is not an issue which need be con·
sidered by the Court on appeal.
COXCLUSION
The matter before the Court is really not as com·
plieated as appellant attempts to make it, it was simply
a case of property of an
not having ever been
properly disposed of through probate proceedings, be·
cause it was at the time considered economically un·
feasible. An inflated value of certain stock certificates
years later, give rise to a sizeable estate, recognizable
as such for the first time 19 years after the death of the
owner of the certificates. None of the heirs had asserted
any control or ownership of the stock certificates until
19G9, at which time the appellant converted all of the
proceeds of the stock to her own use, through an unlaw·
f ul conversion and sale of the stock, without probate.
The trial court, at pretrial decided that the clisput·
ed propertly belonged to the estates, unless appellant
could prove two successive intervivos gifts of stock by
elear and convincing evidence. This she failed to do, the
Court therefore correctly held the contested property
to have been converted by appellant and awarded judg·

15

ment in favor of the administrator of the two estates.
Respectfully submitted this
1972.

!!'!!. day

of July,

GLEN J. ELLIS,
.Attorney for the Respondent

